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Abstract
Numerous differences exist between the neoclassical and national development schools of
economics on how an economy should develop. For example, should the state interfere in the
market using state resources, and cultivate certain industries to achieve specific
developmental goals? Although the automotive industries in both Thailand and Malaysia
developed in the 1970s with considerable government involvement, they have evolved along
very different lines. Can these differences be traced to different interactions between the state
and industry in these two countries? This paper examines this issue and finds that although
industries in developing countries need government assistance, the specific political and
economic contexts of each country affect the policies adopted and their effectiveness. The
choice between “autonomous development” (Malaysia) and “dependent development”
(Thailand) is the first issue. The second issue is that politics in Malaysia has deterred the
automotive industry from adopting a “market following” position. This paper finds that the
choice of strategy and political interference are the two main reasons the automotive industry
in Malaysia is less competitive than that in Thailand.
Keywords: Automotive Industry, Developmental State, Malaysia Automotive
Industry, Thai Automotive Industry, PROTON, Political Economic Analysis
Introduction
In the wake of the 2008 economic crash,
whether the U.S. government should
financially support the domestic automotive
industry has become a matter of debate. The
automotive industry has been one of the
three main industries in the U.S. for the past
hundred years, and is involved in other
sectors and industries as diverse as iron, oil,
manufacturing, sales, the stock market,
credit, and insurance. Because of the huge
knock-on effects that a collapse of this
industry might have on the wider economy,
the possibility of government intervention
in the U.S. automotive industry remains an
option (Yun-Han Chu, 2008: 20).
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This debate has touched on issues
related to developmental economics such
as, when a new industry is launched or
faces crises, should the state intervene and
help the industry, or should they follow the
selective policy to help only certain firms?
In what type of situation should
governments intervene? Will state resources
devoted to the industry be used efficiently
to reach the development goal? These topics
have been the focus of debates that have
never reached a consensus.
Most scholars of developmental
economics feel that because of lacking
market mechanisms and limited resources
in developing nations, policy intervention
in industry is necessary to accelerate
industrialization. However, although
industries in developing countries need
state intervention, not all such interventions
yield expected results. Could such
supported industries survive when the
government withdraws its protection? What
are the costs and benefits for the
government under these policy
interventions? How can international
pressure to remove such protection be
handled? To protect vested interests,
manufacturers might use non-financial
resources to raise barriers to entry, thus
weakening their own market
competitiveness, which lead to poor results
in the long term. All of these issues are
important for studies of economic policies
adopted in developing countries (Wan-Wen
Chu, 2001: 67).
Differing from the diverse studies of
East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Japan,
and South Korea, on official organization
and industry development, relevant issues
between the state and industrial policies in
Southeast Asian countries are seldom
focused. This study discusses the policies
for the automotive industry in Malaysia and
Thailand because both of these developing
countries have been eager to upgrade their
domestic industrial base by developing the
car sector (Rasiah, 1999). However, despite
sharing a number of similarities in their
developmental backgrounds and with
governmental organizations taking a
leading role in the industry, they have also
diverged and chosen relatively different
paths to further development. Malaysia has
adopted its automotive industry as a
national industry, with an “independent
development” strategy applied to establish
a national brand, whereas Thailand has
chosen to cooperate with international car
manufacturers and adopted the “dependent
development” strategy, which has made its
domestic automotive industry part of the
worldwide supply chain. The results of
these two strategies show that the
“independent development” of Malaysia
has yielded fewer benefits (Fuangkajonsak,
2006: 1-3).
Examining the development of the
automotive industry with the development
of politics and economics in countries can
obtain a clearer picture of the relationship
between the state and industrial
development. This article does not focus on
the theoretical study of specific issues
related to developing countries, but
analyzes how different historical systems
result in different strategic choices and
developmental effects by integrating
international and domestic political and
economic factors ( Abbott, 2003). Although
industrial development in developing
countries relies on government
intervention, the economic and political
background of each country affects their
selection of specific strategies: namely, the
strategic choice between the “independent
development” of Malaysia and the
“dependent development” of Thailand;
then the “politicality” of the automotive
industry in Malaysia intervened with the
“follow-the-market” policy. The results of
“strategic selection” and “political
intervention” are the two main reasons this
article concludes that the development of
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the automotive industry in Malaysia has
been inferior to that in Thailand.
Theoretical Study: The state, industrial
development, and automotive industry
policies.
The State and Industrial Development
Scholars typically discuss the
developmental patterns of a national
industry from two perspectives. Under a
good economic environment, scholars
following neo-classical economics believe
that industry grows spontaneously with a
comparative advantage. In their view,
competition should be free and open at the
start of an industry to allow private
investors to allot resources based on
economic rationality because this is best
able to raise competitiveness (Balassa, 1988:
27-57; Bhagwati, 1988: 27-57). Scholars of
liberalism accept this view (Kruegert, 1993).
The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and
Public Policy, published in 1993 by the
World Bank, is a typical work from this
school (Stiglitz and Shahid, 1994). Its main
conclusion was that giving up market price
control is essential when hoping to develop
industrial competitiveness in transforming
agriculture in developing countries.
However, scholars from the school of
development economics have raised
numerous doubts of the neoclassical
approach (Fishlow, 1994; Lindauder, 1994:
12). Some make a case for the so-called
“Dependency Theory,” which proposes that
international factors, particularly the
political and economic power from
hegemonic countries, such as the United
States, play an active economic role in
developing countries. This type of
development is known as “invited
development.” Other scholars state that
economic progress is not mainly caused by
“market” and “internationality.” They do
not believe that economic development in
developing countries, particularly East
Asian countries, should ascribe to
governments remaining neutral, and they
also criticize the World Bank report for
neglecting the importance of the state in
industrial development.
These scholars offer an extremely
different explanation from neoclassical
economics (Jomo, 1994): 461-508). For
example, Johnson introduced a concept of
“developing-type country” for Japanese
industrial research in 1982, which stated
that industrialization in the so-called New
Nations is related to the great promotion of
economic development by the state
(Johnson, 1982; Shumpei Kumon and Henry
Rosovsky, 1972: 109-141). Taking South
Korea as an example, Hasan claimed that its
successful economy was based on
government intervention. Hasan also stated,
“The economy in South Korea relies on the
operation of private enterprises that are in
fact directed by the central government. The
state not only establishes policies and rules,
but also dominates the economy by
controlling market mechanisms, and thus
has a critical impact on all entrepreneurial
decisions (Hasan, 1976).
Those scholars who support
“Developmental State Theory” think that
industrial development in developing
countries relies on intervention and
protection from the state. This authorizes
the government to control the production,
allotment, and price of goods to reach the
best arrangement of resources (Kuckiki,
2007: 3-6). They believe that despite
liberalism aiding industrialization, the lack
of a market mechanism might lead to an
environment that increases the risk to
industry and adversely influence
production. With insufficient private
investment and limited resources, selective
government intervention becomes
necessary for rapid industrialization (Wan-
Wen Chu, 1997: 99-100). These ideas
highlight the following two phenomena for
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the relationship between the state and
industrial policies:
1. The state provides necessary
production factors: To facilitate
economic development, the
government commands the financial
system to finance industries for
upgrading or expansion. These
funds are typically preferential loans
with interest rates that are
substantially lower than the market
rate, and are helpful for industrial
growth.
2. The state launches policy
intervention to protect industries: At
the initial stages of development,
industries are typically unable to
compete with foreign firms;
therefore, to encourage industrial
development and expand export
trade, the state provides support
with preferential tax policies and
work to limit competition (Freeman,
1982: 90-112).
Industrial policy and automotive industry policy
Automotive industry has been an
important issue for scholars involved in
research on “the State” and “industrial
policy” in developing countries (Jenkins,
1987; Jenkins, 1995: 625-645; Doner, 1991).
Many developing countries, such as Brazil,
Mexico, South Korea, and previously
Taiwan, have attempted to make the
automotive industry the motivator of
industrialization. However, for some
countries (such as Taiwan), such
intervention has proved unsuccessful in the
car industry and needs further research
(Jenkins, 1995: 642). The application of
automotive industry technology often
expands to other industries, thus
contributing greatly to the national
economy by promoting technological
abilities, increasing employment
opportunities, and revenue (Dicken, 1998:
316; Humphrey, 2000: 245-271). The
automotive industry belongs to a high
value-added industry, which is also a
capital-intensive and technology-intensive
industry. The production process involves
upstream industries such as steel,
electronics, and plastic industries, and has
great influence on downstream industries
such as marketing, service, maintenance,
insurance, and finance industries
(Konosuke, 1993). Therefore, based on the
goal of industrial development and political
and economic backgrounds, many countries
employ various policies, such as “Limited
local content rate,” “Energy consumption
standards,” “Limited auto import tax,”
“Limited import quantity,” “Import
quotas,” and “Import Substituting
Industrialization Strategy,” to fulfill the
purpose of policy intervention in the auto
industry Rasiah, 1997). Scholars normally
divide automotive industry development
into four stages:
1. Importing Completely Built up
vehicles (hereafter referred to as
CBU)
2. Semi-Knocked Down (SKD) and
Completely Knocked-Down
(hereafter referred to as CKD)
3. Full Assembly
4. Manufacturing
National intervention has three goals in
these stages (Fitzgerald eds, 1995): First, to
establish the industrial scale. The state
normally assists local enterprises to
establish an industrial supply chain to
promote local production of key
components through an “import
substitution” policy. Second, to help the
automotive industry transform through the
“assembly,” “semi-assembly,” “fully
assembled,” to “manufacturing” stages,
which requires that the rate of locally made
parts must reach certain percentages. Third,
the state becomes the driver of industrial
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internationalization. When the local
automotive industry has the capacity to
manufacture a whole car, the state can help
them export products to other countries
through consolidation, production control,
and a unified development model. The final
goal is for local firms to be able to set up
production plants in other countries and
form transnational automotive groups.
During the transformation process from
“assembly” to “manufacturing,” the state
normally has two choices, “dependency
development” and “independent
development”. First, the dependency
development mode is a way to increase
industrial competitiveness that relies on
foreign technology and fund of funds.
Therefore, it is necessary to open domestic
markets to attract foreign investment-led
industrial development. This typically
means that after Transnational Automotive
Corporations (TNCs) obtain a license, they
set up local assembly plants and help
domestic enterprises establish an industrial
scale of component manufacturing. For
example, local firms in Mexico, Brazil, and
Spain were all aided by multinational
corporations and thus able to develop
highly efficient supply chains to then build
an internationalized automotive industry
with some areas of comparative advantage
(such as market, location, and labor force).
Second, the independent development
mode is a policy that can raise
competitiveness of the local automotive
industry by relying on the development of a
monopolistic market, with the supply chain
formed by local investors and enterprises.
For example, South Korea relied on its own
strength to develop an automotive industry,
gradually building up R&D capabilities and
a local brand.1
1 Taking South Korea as an example, the Automotive
Industry Promotion Law was passed in 1962. Auto
imports were prohibited and large-scale enterprises
were chosen as the main participants of the
automotive industry. South Korea thus became the
These two approaches have both
advantages and disadvantages (See Table
1).
Based on this discussion, this research
makes the following analysis: Because of the
lack of market mechanisms and limited
resources, to accelerate industrialization,
developing countries rely on state
intervention as a protection measure;
therefore, selective intervention is
necessary. Furthermore, the automotive
industry plays a major role in promoting
industrialization in developing countries.
National intervention has the following
three targets: first, to establish the
foundation of the industry; second,
transform the industry from “component
assembly” to “manufacturing;” third, the
state becomes the driver of industrial
internationalization. Moreover, industrial
interventions do not necessarily reach the
goal of nurturing the automotive industry.
Considering whether the industry could be
self-reliant after receiving protection, and if
the benefits outweigh the social costs
produced in the protectionist period, is
necessary In addition, how will a protected
industry eventually adapt to a more open
international market?
world’s key auto production base and the fourth
largest auto production country in a short period.
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Table 1: Analysis of Different Automotive industry Development Approaches
Approach Advantages Disadvantages
Dependency
development
 Smaller financial
burden on the
government
 Less pressure on the
open market
 The automotive industry is
dominated by foreign capital
 More difficult to develop the
economic scale of mass
production
 Cannot bring about the growth
of related industries
Independent
development
 Protection brings mass
production
 More likely to support
the growth of related
industries
 Can use the home
country’s resources
 Greater financial burden on the
government
 Over-protection cannot respond
to pressure from trade
liberalization
Source: Organized and rewritten by the author, based on Rashid, 2006.
Establishment of Malaysia’s automotive
industry
Establishment of the automotive industry
Malaysia’s automotive industry was
established in 1963. Under the Colombo
Plan, the Malaysian government formulated
a localized production policy for the
automotive industry. In 1964, the Malaysian
government set out a policy of promoting
vehicle assembly and localized component
production, and thus prohibited the import
of completely built vehicles and
implemented localized production. The
Ministry of Trade and Industry founded the
Motor Vehicle Assemblers Committee
(MVAC), responsible for reviews of related
investment. Consequently, companies
engaged in the import of CBU had to
manage complex import processes and pay
high import taxes, and thus the import of
assembly cars grew very rapidly (Torii,
1991). Certain restrictions were employed,
such as an import duty on CBU or control of
the auto dealer by license renewal twice a
year.
In 1967, the Malaysian government
approved the establishment of six auto
assembly plants. In the same year, it passed
the Investment Incentive Act to encourage
more assembly cars to use locally made
auto parts. At this early stage, assembly
plants were established by joint ventures
between European manufacturers and local
enterprises, and the assembled vehicles
were mainly European and Japanese cars,
with the latter coming to dominate the
Malaysian car-assembly market in the
1970s.
Although Malaysia hoped to promote
the growth of the local component
production industry by increasing the level
of local manufacturing, because of
numerous assembly manufacturers and
different vehicles needing various
components, it was impossible to conduct
mass production, and thus the products
produced did not have any price advantage.
To elevate the quality of locally made
components, the Malaysian government
proposed the Mandatory Deletion Program
in 1979, to weed out unqualified
manufacturers, simplify production, and
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increase industrial competitiveness.
However, the Japanese-based group of
foreign car manufacturers and Chinese-
Malaysian investors still controlled
automotive assembly, component
production, and marketing. Therefore, the
Malaysian government began to consider
transforming its assembly-oriented industry
into a car manufacturing one.
Homemade vehicle plans and
internationalization of the automotive industry
The transformation of Malaysia’s
automotive industry began in 1982, when
Prime Minister Mahathir announced the
homemade vehicle production plan, which
was controlled by The Heavy Industries
Corporation of Malaysia Berhad (HICOM),
the group responsible for implementing the
country's National Heavy Industries Plan
and Industrial Master Plan Project (IMP).
These actions were taken in hopes of
leading the automotive industry into the
self-development mode.
To reach this goal, HICOM chose to
cooperate with Japan's Mitsubishi Motors to
establish PROTON Motors (perusahaan
otomotif). HICOM held 70% of the shares in
this company, and Mitsubishi Motors had
the remaining 30%. At first, PROTON was
only responsible for vehicle assembly, but
with government support, it gradually
began to take charge of design, mechanics,
logistics, and marketing. In 1985, PROTON
SAGA launched its own brand car, SAGA.
In the mid-80s, Malaysia underwent an
economic crisis caused by the oil market
collapse, existing markets re-shuffled, and
PROTON became the leading brand in the
Malaysia auto market (Wad, 1999).
The state of Malaysia and Automotive industry
The form of the state, its structure, and
developmental strategy have an obvious
connection to its interaction with civil
society. In the social structure of Malaysia,
conflicts among ethnic groups are closely
related to industrial policy (Soong, 1996). In
1969, because of economic inequality, the
so-called “513 race riots” broke out and
became an important turning point in the
economic development of Malaysia.2
Afterwards, the Malaysian government
proposed its New Economic Policy (NEP) in
1971, developed a technocrat bureaucrat
authoritarian regime, and directly
intervened in economic development
through the “Kuota” (quota) system to
reduce economic inequality between ethnic
groups.
The new economic policy was based on
the concept of “National Capitalism,” and
tried to raise the proportion of the indigenous
Malay Group” (or Bumiputra), an ethnic
group that participated in the economy,3
thus promoting the ethnic redistribution of
wealth, and relieving conflict. The
development mode of national capitalism in
Malaysia in this period was state-driven,
with the government directly intervening in
the market (Soong, 1996).
The state during this period primarily
focused on the automotive industry and
considered it the national industry of
2 Malaysia's three main ethnic groups are Malays,
Chinese, and Indians, and the respective proportions
are approximately 62%, 30%, and 8%. Most scholars
think “Racial communitarianism” is the main
characteristics of Malaysia. See Samuel C.Y. Ku,
Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, (Taipei:
Wunan, 1995), p.71. In the election of May, 1969,
Malaysia's ruling coalition suffered defeat, which
caused a series of racial conflicts, claimed 196 lives,
and wounded 439. The Malay ruling elite believed the
fundamental reason was long-term conflicts, unequal
policy, mistrust, opposition, and ethnocentrism
between Malay and Chinese. See B. T. Khoo, The
Paradoxes of Mahathirism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995), pp. 52-54.
3 Bumiputra originates from Sanskrit, which means
sons of the soil. According to the constitution of
Malaysia, it refers to the Malay community in
Malaysia and the minority groups in Sabah and
Sarawak.
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Malaysia.4 Malaysia’s automotive industry
development started with car assembly
(1963-1982), and then Mahathir promoted
the Homemade cars Plan in 1982 and
encouraged the local automotive industry to
work on exports. The aim of this plan was
to improve the low domestic rate and alter
the industrial structure, which was
dominated by ethnic Chinese investors. In
an attempt to lead private sector
investment, the state of Malaysia used
various strategic industrial policy tools,
such as tax incentives and subsidies,
preferential bank loans, market protection,
government orders, and technology
development to develop a strategic
industrial policy (Camilleri, 2000).
To ensure smooth development of its
domestic vehicle plan, the state of Malaysia
instituted a series of industrial policy
interventions, including the following
actions (Gustafsson, 2006):
1. Increased import tariffs on
completely built vehicles and
components;
2. Implemented quotas for imported
cars;
3. Encouraged foreign capital to
participate in domestic car programs
4. Offered production subsidies to
domestic auto parts manufacturers,
lowered the price of components
from 10% to 12%, increased tariff on
imported components, and
prolonged items tax relief, so that
the price of homemade vehicles
would be lower than that of
imported cars of the same standard
5. Encouraged domestic car
manufacturers to export vehicles
and auto parts (especial OEM parts)
to ASEAN countries, and used the
4 Automotive Federation of Malaysia (AFM),
“Submission of AFM on the Industrial Master Plan,”
in The ASEAN Motor Industry in Economist Intelligence
Unit (KL: EIU, 1984), p. 1.
export channels of technical
cooperation plants to sell them to
other Asian countries.
6. Offered civil service low-interest
loans to purchase domestic cars.
With the Homemade Cars Plan to build
up the brand PROTON, Malaysia employed
the independent development strategy in an
attempt to build the industry through state
protection, which was initially effective. In
1989, PROTON began to export vehicles to
other countries. From the latter 1980s to the
early 1990s, the domestic market share of
PROTON SAGA models was nearly 45%.
PROTON merged with Lotus, a leading
British brand, in 1997, and became the focus
of the international automotive market. In
addition to PROTON, the second domestic
car, PERODUA, was also developed with
state support in October 1992, with the aim
to provide a large-scale supplier for the
spare parts market. In its heyday, because
of the automotive group formed by
PROTON and PERODUA, the supply chain
had 350 chain-related companies, with a
total investment of RM 4.6 billion,
employing more than three million people,
and producing 6,000 auto parts, nearly RM
20 billion worth. PROTON has not only
become the largest brand in the Malaysia
car market, but also the only domestically
manufactured car brand in an ASEAN
country.
Establishment of Thailand’s automotive
industry
Contrasted to Malaysia, the industrial
development of Thailand was led by foreign
capital and the private sector, and the state
did not participate as an active leader. In
the case of the automotive industry, the
Thai government mainly cooperated with
multinational corporations (MNCs),
offering various incentives to encourage
them to build production bases in Thailand.
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Local enterprises produced spare parts and
became peripheral industries.
The development of Thailand’s
automotive industry is divided into four
stages: first, the establishment stage (1961-
1970), focusing on creating production
capacity; second, the national regulatory
period (1971-1989), focusing on
strengthening production and further
localization; third, and fourth: liberalization
(1990-now), focusing on full liberalization
and export promotion, in response to the
liberalization trend of world trade.
The establishment period (1960-1980): import
substitution policy
The automotive industry in Thailand
began in the 1960s, following the period in
which all cars were imported. The first auto
company, Thai Motor Industry Company,
was established in 1961. The next year, The
Office of the Board Investment was set up
and offered many preferential terms for the
automotive assembly industry. Industrial
development can bring economic
development; therefore, the state began to
nurture the domestic automotive industry,
hoping to cooperate with European and
Japanese manufacturers to establish an
industrial base. In this stage, the state of
Thailand offered foreign investors the
following preferential terms (Fujita, 1998):
1. Fifty percent reduction in import
tariffs on completely knocked-down
vehicles (CKD) for five years;
2. Five-year joint venture income tax
relief;
3. Free remittance of foreign exchange;
4. Free flow of capital and technology
in Thailand
After implementing these preferential
terms for industrial development, the
numbers of car assembly plants rapidly
increased. In 1967, the state of Thailand
established The Federation of Thai
Industries, which took charge of integrating
and planning Thailand's state-led industrial
development. At that time, Thailand lacked
industrial experience and local personnel
who were good at management, and thus
needed help from foreign investors and
firms. Therefore, during the early days of
the automotive industry, the state allowed
multinational automotive groups to
cooperate with local investors to form joint
ventures.
Those assembly plants that were
granted privileges from the state enjoyed
lower tariffs for whole vehicle components.
However, importing large quantities of
components led to serious payment deficits
in Thailand. This problem became more
apparent in the late 1960s, and thus in 1969,
the state ceased establishing auto
manufacturing companies under the advice
of the Parliament Automotive Industry
Development Committee, reexamined the
developmental direction of the industrial
sector, and changed to nurturing the
domestic industry by “import-substitution
industrialization.” To ensure industrial
autonomy, the Ministry of Industry (MOI)
announced a comprehensive reform
program for the auto industry in 1971,
which required that local assembly vehicles
use at least 25% locally made components.
The policy of economic nationalism
upheld by Prime Minister Thanom
Kittikchorn was the main reason for this
change. Thanom tried to implement
national capitalism to revitalize industry,
avoid economic exploitation of foreign
capital, and achieve the modernization of
Thailand. He believed the state should lead
in the development of the automotive
industry through working with domestic
investors and The Federation of Thai
Industries, and help local producers
compete against imports through
protectionist policies.
To strengthen the development of local
industry and reach an enhanced economic
scale of production, in the 1970s, the state of
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Thailand restricted the number of domestic
assembly car models and further promoted
localization, which aided the development
of the component sector (Fujita, 1998). The
Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers Association
(TAPMA) was established in 1978 and
served as a mechanism for industrial
integration and development of the
component manufacturing industry. In the
same year, the state of Thailand announced
the prohibition of whole vehicle import
(CBU) and increased tariffs on import
assembly (CKD) as the first step to protect
the domestic automotive industry. Under
these measures, the state ceased granting
production privileges and increased the
required proportion of domestic production
parts, gradually increasing the number of
local component manufacturers.
The relaxation period (1980-1989)
Following the second oil crisis in 1979,
the prices of agricultural products in
Thailand fell and caused heavy economic
losses. In the hope of obtaining loans from
the World Bank, and facing pressure from
multiple forces in society and multinational
corporations, civil society groups, led by the
Joint Public Private Consultative Committee
(JPPCC, established in 1981), required a
change in economic policies in Thailand
from import substitution to export-oriented.
This change had a significant influence on
the development of the automotive industry
(Abdulsomad, 2003). In 1982, Thailand froze
the 1978 “Ratio of Origin” requirement. In
addition to policy transformation, the state
of Thailand also hoped that the automotive
industry could develop a key competitive
advantage, and thus focused on pick-up
trucks as the main product, and worked to
position the nation as the global production
center for such vehicles.
To increase the use of local components,
in 1984, the government announced a joint
project between Peugeot France and local
enterprises, known as the Domestic Car
Manufacturing Project (Kesavatana, 1989).
The plan projected that 95% of Thai car
components were to be locally produced.
However, because this might have caused a
significant loss of tariffs for imported
components, several interest groups and
government agencies opposed this plan,
which ultimately suspended the domestic
car project.
After 1985, Thailand's automotive
industry underwent several significant
changes. The “Plaza Accord” forced the
appreciation of the yen,5 and Japanese
enterprises needed to move overseas to
lower-cost locations, causing Thailand to
become the first overseas investment choice
for the Japanese automotive industry.6
Taking this opportunity, the state of
Thailand offered increasing tax concessions
to Japanese-based multinational
corporations, and created an environment
that was more conducive for their
investments. These industrial liberalization
measures caused foreign investment (FDI)
to rise. Increased foreign capital maintained
Thailand’s economic growth rate at 9% on
average, causing the rise of a middle class,
which increased demand in the domestic
automotive market. The rising middle class
and the development of a partially
liberalized automotive industry forced the
5 September 22, 1985, United States, Japan, Britain,
France, and West Germany, the five industrial
countries, gathered at the Plaza Hotel, New York, for
a secret meeting. Their finance ministers and central
bank presidents signed the famous “Plaza Accord” to
undertake joint intervention in the foreign exchange
market, forcing the U.S. dollar down against the
Japanese yen, German mark, and other major
currencies in an orderly manner, to resolve the
massive U.S. trade deficit, which led to significant
appreciation of the Japanese yen.
6Thailand particularly welcomed Japanese capital,
mainly because Japanese investment was labor-
intensive and could create more job opportunities.
Moving the major market to a foreign country (i.e. re-
exports) could reduce the exploitation potential by the
Japanese market.
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state to consider reopening the market for
import cars.
The export-oriented period (1990-2000)
Under the ruling of reformist Prime
Minister Anand Punyarachun, the state of
Thailand gradually abolished the
restrictions on the automotive industry in
the 1990s by partially reopening the market
for imported vehicles, and substantially
lowering tariffs on imported cars and
components. In 1993, the Thai government
announced the Export Promotion Project of
the Automotive industry, and abolished
restrictions on setting up auto assembly
plants by foreign firms, transformed the
domestic market-oriented industrial policy
to an export-oriented one, and boosted
exports to deal with increasing import
competition. These changes led the growth
rate of automotive manufacturing to
become the highest in the world from 1990
to 1994, resulting in 20% annual growth of
the domestic market.
The Thai government relaxed controls
on the automotive industry because the
state sensed the necessity to closely follow
the trends of technological development in
major producing countries, such as Japan
and Europe, to reach its internationalization
goal. In view of this, it implemented an
open industry policy, and chose the
development mode of cooperation with
foreign investors. The Thai government
thus developed a series of measures
including reduced tariffs, eight years of
corporate income tax exemption, offsetting
import taxes on machinery and equipment,
material import duty rebates, and further
relaxations of trade restrictions.
Table 2: Comparison of Thailand’s import tariffs on CBU and CKD (1986-2000)
Mode
Year
Sedan under
2300cc
Sedan over
2300cc
One-ton Pick-
up truck Big truck
1986
1991
1992
1994
1997
1999
2000
CBU CKD CBU
CK
D CBU CKD
CB
U
CK
D
180
60
42
42
80
80
80
112
20
20
20
20
20
33
300
100
68.5
68.5
80
80
80
112
20
20
20
20
20
33
120
60
60
60
60
60
60
30
20
20
20
20
20
33
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Source: Based on data obtained from the Board of Investment, Thailand, and the Thai
Embassy in Japan,
The Period of Embracing Free Trade (2000-now)
The internationalization of Thailand’s
automotive industry began in the 1990s.
After the financial crisis of 1988, Thailand
continued an active policy of opening its
economy.7 To mitigate liquidity problems, it
7 The Asian financial crisis of 1997 hit the Thai
adopted deregulation to allow foreign
investors to own 100% of their Thai
subsidiaries. This policy could solve the
overcapacity problem caused by a shrinking
economy and caused great damage to the automotive
industry, causing a sharp fall in the domestic and
regional market demand, and thus shrinking car
production by 40%.
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domestic market by increasing exports.
However, it was a response to globalization
and the need for greater regional economic
integration.
After joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2000, Thailand
abolished its rules of origin on vehicle and
components, and allowed multinational
companies to set up wholly owned
enterprises. Consequently, foreign investors
dominated the auto assembly industry,
while local firms were engaged in the
supply chain related to spare parts.
In addition to the WTO norms, regional
integration in the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) accelerated the liberalization of the
Thai automotive industry. The AFTA norms
lowered import tariffs and non-tariff
measures to between 0% and 5% in 2003 for
old member states of the ASEAN (Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand). The automotive industry in
Thailand was included in the list of five
main industries by the Board of Investment
(BOI) that the government used to attract
more multinational manufacturers to build
plants in Thailand. The ASEAN Industrial
Cooperation Scheme (AICO) states that
when the auto parts manufacturing
industry of a country meets the standard of
using parts that are 40% locally made, it can
then enjoy a 0% to 5% special tariff within
ASEAN. Thailand implemented a
liberalization policy and its tariff reduction
projects met the time frame and standards
set out in this free trade agreement.
Therefore, since 2003, Thailand has reduced
tariffs on imported cars to 5% (Hsu, 2002).
The dependent development mode of
Thailand’s automotive industry led to the
following results: its automotive industry
ranks as the fifth largest export industry; as
a car exporter, Thailand ranks the first
among ASEAN countries and the third in
Asia after Japan and South Korea; and
Thailand made cars are sold in the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Thailand
also has the largest automotive assembly
base in Southeast Asia, and has become one
of the top ten auto manufacturers; it has 16
domestic car assembly plants and 1,800
component production plants; and after
2005, it has produced more pick-up trucks
than any other country worldwide (Zhao,
2006).
Thailand’s auto industry policy
In view of Thailand’s auto industry
policy, the Ministry of Industry has been
responsible for its control and adjustment
and the secondary Automotive Industry
Association has been in charge of setting up
specific industrial policies and development
plans. The following chart shows the
industrial policies implemented from 1962
to 2000 to nurture the Thai automotive
industry.
Table 3: Thailand's auto industry policies
Year Industrial Policy
1962
Implemented an automotive assembly industry-promotion
system (five-year reduction in import tariff on CKD to 50%, five-year
reduction of corporate tax).
1967
Increased the import tariff on whole vehicles to 60%; lowered the
import tariff on CKD for sedans by 30%, special trucks 20%, and
trucks 10%.
1975 Implemented 25% localization.
1978 Prohibited auto imports, reexamined import tariff rates, and
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prohibited the establishment of car assembly plants.
1980 Began domestic car parts design (achieving the goal of 50% in1983).
1982 Froze the ratio of automotive localization at 45%.
1983
Proposed a new auto industry development policy, the goal of
localization, with sedans at 54% in 1987, special trucks at 62% in
1988, and included the norms for new models, that imported body or
engine parts and gearboxes only have one selection.
1985 Allowed vehicle importation with over 2.3 L displacement,although the import tariff was 300%.
1986 Small commercial vehicles must use domestic engines.
1989 Implemented the use of 20% domestic engines.
1991
Allowed the import of vehicles with under 2.3 L displacement,
reduced import tariff rate for sedans with over 2.3 L displacement
from 300% to 100%, that for under 2.3 L displacement from 180% to
60%, for bulk-type sedans from 112% to 20%, and bulk-type trucks
from 30% to 20%.
1992
Changed import tariffs on whole cars, with sedan under 2.4 L
displacement falling from 60% to 42%, sedans with over 2.4 L
displacement from 100% to 68.5%, special trucks from 120% to 60%,
including Value-Added Tax and the repeal business tax.
1993 Abolished the restriction of setting up auto assembly plants,allowed vehicles less than two years old to be used as taxis.
1994 Implemented preferential tariffs on whole car exports.
1997
Abolished a unified price system for vehicles with under 1.6 L
displacement; repealed consumption tax on vehicles for less than ten
passengers and priced below 100 million baht. The Value-Added tax
rate was increased from 7% to 10%, all import tariffs on vehicles
were raised to 80%. Excise tax on sedans and special trucks was
raised to 5%.
1998
Relaxed the restriction on auto financing payment caps, which
were relaxed from 48 months to 72 months, and lowered the down
payment ratio of the total selling price from 25%-30% to 10%-20%.
2000 Repealed all requirements for auto parts localization.
Thailand chose the dependent
development mode based on its attitude
toward foreign capital. Thailand has
adopted an open-door policy since 1885,
particularly under the effect of British
colonial policy development, and thus the
long relationship between Thailand and
transnational corporations has been very
close. Because of this, the early stage of
economic development in Thailand relied
on dependency and economic interaction,
formed in the context of having a “UK-core”
and “Thailand-frontier.” Since 1950, the
state has acted to gradually improve the
position of Thailand in the international
economic structure. Therefore, its continued
cooperation with foreign investors and
multinational corporations has enhanced its
domestic industrialization, dependent
development has become the key policy for
industrialization, and the relationship and
interaction between the state and
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multinational corporations has also become
more important (Soong, 1996).
In the 1970s, during the early
developmental stage of Thailand’s
automotive industry, high tariffs and
restrictions of origin were used to protect
the domestic industry, while a limited
number of car models were produced to
gain the economic benefits of scale.
However, these protectionist measures did
not lead to the rapid development of the
local automotive industry, because high car
prices limited domestic demand, which was
not conducive to industrial development.
After the 1980s, the middle-class had grown
considerably in Thailand, the state
gradually lost its ability to lead industrial
policy, and the government bureaucracy
lacked effective tools to undertake this.
Therefore, in the developmental mode,
opening and renewing cooperation with
foreign investors, particularly Japanese
multinational corporations, became
necessary (Heggard, 1998). Economic
growth in the 1990s caused considerable
domestic demand for automotive, which
forced the government to open the market
to car imports and relax restrictions on car
models. Hence, the automotive industry-
investment promotion policy in Thailand
attracted multinational auto manufacturers
to set up plants in the country, expand the
scale of the industry, and establish a
regional production centre. After the
financial crisis in the 1990s, the state turned
its industrial policy objectives toward the
international market. Because joint ventures
produced most of the cars and components,
through the market channels and
international operating experience of their
international cooperation partners, Thai
firms acquired the ability to integrate with
the international market.
Similar to Malaysia, Thailand attempted
to develop a domestic car in the 1980s.
However, because high import tariffs
resulted in substantial revenues for the
state, this plan was cancelled under the
pressure of domestic tax units. The
evolution of Thailand's automotive industry
policy has shown that the State
implemented import tariffs and localization
as protection measures and set up major
development models, limiting car
production to assist main products in
reaching market size.
Comparison of the development of the
automotive industry in Malaysia and
Thailand
Sales, production efficiency, and technology
Malaysia also began to develop its auto
industry in the 1960s; however, the different
development mode adopted achieved
different results to those in Thailand. In the
initial stages of their industries, vehicle
production volume and sales in Thailand
were both less than those of Malaysia, with
the former implementing protectionist
policies. However, since the adoption of an
open market policy in Thailand in 1990,
both its production and volume not only
surpassed Malaysia, but also entered the
international auto market. In 2000, auto
exports in Thailand exceeded sales in the
domestic market, and since 2004,
approximately one third of all vehicles
produced in Thailand have been for export.
In contrast, the auto industry in Malaysia
has been substantially more limited and
with far fewer exports, shown in Table 4.
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Table 4: Comparison of auto production and sales in Malaysia and Thailand
Year Thailand Malaysia
Homem
ade car
production
Domesti
c sales
Homema
de car
production
Domesti
c sales
1985 83,105 85,222 107,030 94,999
1990 304,843 304,062 191,580 165,861
1995 525,680 571,580 288,838 285,792
2000 411,721 262,189 360,105 343,173
2003 750,512 533,176 426,646 405,745
2004 928,081 625,435 471,975 487,605
Source: Fuangkajonsak, 2006, p. 24.
Table 5: JAMA manufacturing capacity ratings for Thailand and Malaysia
Item Thailand Malaysi
a
Engine High Low
Engine parts High Low
Electronic
systems High Standard
Braking system Standard High
Interior High Low
Source: Fuangkajonsak, 2006, p. 45
Table 6: Price comparison of the same vehicle in Malaysia and Thailand
Model Price in
Thailand
Price in
Malaysia
Remarks
NISSAN X Trail 120,909 136,030 RM units
calculated on the
Thai baht 1:11(Price
in 2006)
TOYOTA Camry
2.0E
105,000 149,149
HONDA Civic 2.0E 92,727 127,465
Source: Organized from brand websites in both countries.
At the technical level, research by the
Japanese Automotive Manufacturers
Association (JAMA), indicates that the auto
industry in Malaysia performs worse than
Thailand for industrial technology, export
capabilities, product cost, manufacturing
capacity, and other measures of industrial
competitiveness, shown in Table 5.
When comparing the same models, the
prices of imported cars in Malaysia are
more than 10% higher than in neighbouring
countries, shown in Table 6. In contrast,
driven by the State and foreign capital,
Thailand has earned the reputation of being
the Asian Detroit. Compared with
Thailand's “dependent development,”
Malaysia’s “independent development” has
led to a lack of industrial competitiveness.
From an economic point of view,
researchers believe that the competitive
advantage of the automotive industry in
Thailand lies in the following elements: the
investment of foreign capital; emphasis on
technology transfer from foreign
enterprises, and training local technical staff
to build up the industrial development
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base; and support from the State encourages
car exports.8 In contrast, the literature
provides six main reasons for the decline of
the Malaysian auto industry: (1) Increased
competition in global markets, making it
difficult for domestic companies to enter
into direct competition with multinational
corporations (MNCs)9; (2) Increasingly
stringent new vehicle standards in the
international automotive market, of which
most small factories cannot afford the
related R&D costs; (3) A new era of high oil
prices, which has reduced Page: 70
consumer demand; (4) A globalization
trend, which has led to the concept of a
“World Car,” of which small regional firms
cannot compete with such approaches; (5)
Improved economy in Malaysia, resulting in
consumer desire to buy foreign cars10; and
(6) An already saturated domestic market in
Malaysia. Although Malaysia has promoted
its domestic cars as an export brand, the
country's limited market cannot achieve the
economies of scale needed to reduce costs.
The financial crisis of 1997 shrank the
domestic market, and hurt the industrial
environment for the development of
Malaysia's domestic auto industry
(Holland, 2001).
Although Malaysia built up the
industrial scale of its automotive industry,
and the government continued its
intervention and protection, it never
considered the issue of industrial self-
reliance. State protection caused laziness
and complacency in production and
8 Jing Liu, “The Development Status and Prospects of
Thailand's Automotive Industry,” Auto Industry
Research, No. 6, 2005, pp. 1-3.
9 International auto plants brought the following
production modes and technologies, such as: “Just In
Time” (JIT), global logistics, better component supply
relationships with upstream and downstream
secondary and tertiary level plants, and outsourcing,
which depends on a great market size.
10 To date, Proton's production has still not reached
economies of scale, and only a limited range of car
models is offered.
operations, and managers lacked the power
to seek cost minimization, which led to low
production efficiency. Compared with
Malaysia, the Thailand automotive industry
courted multinational corporations, which
not only brought capital, but also advanced
technology and management methods. This
is why a more open attitude is considered
the main reason for the positive
development of Thailand's automotive
industry.
Response to free trade
In addition to technology and sales
issues, the bigger challenge for the
automotive industry in Southeast Asian
countries comes from international pressure
related to removing market protection.
Besides the World Trade Organization, the
cooperation of automotive industries in
ASEAN countries, under the concept of
economic cooperation, has become a key
element in the region's industrial
cooperation plan. ASEAN countries thus
believe that technical cooperation and trade
liberalization can help auto part and vehicle
production companies achieve economies of
scale, and thus reduce production costs. If
the automotive industry in ASEAN
countries is unable to cooperate actively to
reach greater market size, it will be unable
to increase its industrial competitiveness.
The cooperation of regional industries can
reduce the development costs of shared
components, and help expand overseas
markets.
However, under economic cooperation,
the removal of trade barriers would cause
the automotive industry in ASEAN
countries to face challenges related to
greater international competition, the
liberalization of production and sale, and
industrial repositioning and efficiency
improvement. The auto industry in
Malaysia had enjoyed protection in many
areas, and was thus adversely affected by
ASEAN’s cooperation plan, which lowered
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tariffs on vehicle imports and removed the
“approved permit” of non-tariff barriers,
increasing the pressures related to free trade
(Abdullah, 2006). To protect its automotive
industry, the Malaysian government has
persistently entered it in the list of sectors
temporarily excluded from tariffs, and thus
delayed tariff reductions from 20% in 2005,
to 0%-5% in 2008. The government replaced
import tariffs with excise duties, which
proved to be a more flexible approach to
avoid much of the effects of the ASEAN
open market policy and did not consider
abolishing import licensing until the end of
2010. These practices all violated the terms
of the ASEAN economic cooperation
agreement specification, and have been
criticized by other member states.
Table 7: ASEAN countries’ tariff reduction schedule for imports of fully assembled
cars
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2
006
2
007
2
008
2
009
2
010
Thailand 15% 5% → → → → → → 0%
Philippines 20% 5% → → → → → → 0%
Indonesia 5% → → → → → → → 0%
Malaysia Noreduction
No
reduction
No
reduction 15% 5% → → → 0%
Vietnam Noreduction
No
reduction
No
reduction
No
reduction
20
% → 20% 5% →
Source: ASEAN Automotive Integration: Private Sector Perspective, reference paper in the
8th APEC Automotive Dialogue, Bali, Indonesia, 15-18 May 2006.
In contrast to the situation in Malaysia,
the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO)
agreement offers tax incentives to
automotive factories in this region, and one
of the conditions for receiving this aid is
that over 50% of the products must be
exported (Jing, 2001). Thailand has the
largest automotive market and production
in Southeast Asia, and thus is the biggest
potential beneficiary of this policy. Based on
the concept of free trade, Thailand also
included auto parts as the main tariff
reduction item in its free trade agreements
with Australia, New Zealand, and India. In
addition to having export advantages, the
Thai government also announced that, since
2009, for small vehicles worth less than
US$15,300, the excise tax would fall from
30% to 17%. The main purpose for this
policy was to develop an eco-car model as
the country's second industrial
development plan, following the successful
experience of the plan focused on pick-up
trucks. Given these preferential terms, some
important international manufacturers
chose Thailand as their production base.
Thailand also allows transnational
automotive groups to fully own their
factories, thus reducing the problem of
patent violations. The ultimate goal of
Thailand’s national industrial policy has
been to make it the global production center
for pick-up trucks and eco-cars (Jian, 2008).
The developmental scholar R. H. Wade
(2003), has noted that economic
globalization has changed the global
industrial environment and forced
developing countries to face diverse
situations. When the ability to engage in
protectionism and state intervention
becomes limited, the state must face trade
liberalization issues by adopting different
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strategies to obtain further economic
development. The threshold for a country’s
automotive industry to enter the
international market is rather high, and
when facing the challenges of globalization,
Thailand has been more flexible and
forward-looking, while Malaysia, due to its
protectionist policies and the lack of
multinational strategic alliances, has lost the
opportunity to enhance competitiveness.
Response and Reflection: the Political
Economy of the State and Industrial Policy
The Choice of Industrial Strategies:
“independent development” and “dependence
mode” for the automotive industry
The preceding discussion of the
different industrial development strategies
adopted by Thailand and Malaysia shows
that the State played an important role in
the automotive industries of both countries,
and that both economic development
modes are state-led. Both countries hoped
to develop an automotive industry with the
aid of state intervention, and both achieved
rapid establishment of industrial scale, with
the goal of industrial internationalization to
export their production to other countries.
The main difference between the
industrial policies of Thailand and Malaysia
is the specific developmental strategy
adopted: the former chose the “dependence
mode,” while the latter, “independent
development.” While Thailand’s
dependence mode went through an
industrial protection stage involving
national intervention, the purpose of this
was not to replace, but rather promote, local
enterprises and investment. The State then
chose to form a relationship of production
and technological cooperation with
transnational automotive companies. This
situation is similar to what Wade
mentioned: transnational (automotive)
groups that wish to invest in developing
countries not only consider the domestic
market, but also aim to incorporate the
industrial base of developing countries into
their global production and supply chains.
The automotive industry in Thailand was
built on the following basis: the state’s
"interactional voluntarism” was combined
with international and domestic capital to
form a “triple-alliance,” and this created the
mechanisms needed for independent
development.
The developmental experience of
Thailand’s automotive industry
demonstrates how the government of
developmental states can remain
independent and make the industry self-
reliant after it has first been established and
built up. Scholars of developmental states
propose that even though state intervention
or protection might cause rent-seeking and
laziness, a period of protectionism might
benefit industrial development in the long
run. When facing pressure from a more
open market, and finding that national
intervention and other strategies could not
prevail, Thailand amended its industrial
strategy to one of following the market, and
thus was able to continue to maintain
industrial competitiveness. This approach is
similar to a more recent idea in national
development theory, the State-market
condominium approach, which does not see
the state and the market as opposed to each
other.
Professor Wan-Wen Chu noted that
although national intervention might help,
it will not necessarily promote industrial
development. An examination of how
different countries developed their
automotive industries revealed that South
Korea as one of the few successful cases that
undertook an independent development
strategy. Thus the question must be asked
as to why this is so rarely successful. The
answer is because the automotive industry
in developing countries must rely on the
local market to establish the production
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scale. However, the domestic market is
limited by the country's economic
development, and manufacturers must thus
fight in a highly competitive and rather
small market. To achieve greater success,
most domestic manufacturers choose to
introduce transnational capital, technology,
and brands. Hence, most automotive
manufacturers in developing countries have
cooperated with major firms from the U.S.
and Japan, and have become part of the
global network of large, transnational
automotive groups. In contrast to Thailand,
after the 1970s, Malaysia developed a more
active form of national capitalism based on
the New Economic Policy and Economic
Nationalism, which considered the
automotive industry as a national industry,
and one that should follow the mode of
independent development. However, the
policy of protecting a national brand, in this
case Proton, meant that the industry lost the
opportunity to integrate with the global
market. The small domestic market could
not create economies of scale, the state did
not change its policy from one of market-
leading to following the market, and thus,
the Proton project gradually declined. This
shows that within the global system
structure, it is difficult for industries in
developing countries to undertake self-
reliant development.
Finally, research in the field of political
economics shows that so-called triple
alliances, the combination of international
and domestic capital, and the State, can be
both dynamic and transformative. The
external structure (competition among
transnational corporations) and the internal
structure (national and local business
alliances) change over time and allow the
fluctuation of forces, which affects the form
of such alliances. However, although there
may be changes, as the studies of Arrighi
and Drangel and Gereffi (1992) have shown,
it is rare to maintain their status of a
consistent upward or downward structure.
In the world system, 95% of countries still
maintain their original structure. Therefore,
even though a triple alliance can be
transformative, whether the automotive
industry in Thailand can break the
structural relationship of the international
political and economic system, and move
toward complete self-reliance in the
industrial development, remains doubtful.
Political nature of the Industry: National
political and economic structure and rent-
seeking
Comparing the economic development
strategies of Malaysia and Thailand shows
both economic and political differences. For
some developing countries, state
involvement in industrial policy is based on
political considerations, and thus industrial
policy is an important tool for
implementing nationalism. As mentioned
earlier, due to specific factors related to
certain domestic groups, the automotive
industry in Malaysia was not fully
established based on economic
considerations, and political factors became
an obstacle to its reform.
During development of Malaysia’s
automotive industry, Prime Minister
Mahathir proposed a “domestic car
production project” with the aim of
promoting the businesses of local Malay
groups. Malay firms were thus a beneficiary
of this project, from which emerged the new
rich class. This consolidated Mahathir’s
leadership of both the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO, Malay
group’s ruling party) and Barisan Nasional
(Malaysia's ruling coalition), and
suppressed Chinese-based opposition
forces. The state’s industrial policy became
a vehicle for arbitrary political and
economic decision-making in Mahathir’s 22-
year reign.
In brief, the automotive industry
became an important means of maintaining
sovereignty for the Malay community. This
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is consistent with the criticism of
neoclassical economics of state intervention
in industry. Further analysis of the Proton
ownership structure found that the
shareholders were mostly the state or
enterprises from the Malay community.
This proves that in Malaysia's domestic car
protection plan, social outcomes were far
more important than profit. Therefore, even
though the project was not economically
successful, the state continued to support it,
and reform was difficult to achieve.
Table 8: Proton ownership structure in 2005
Ranking Shareholder Number ofshares ％
Political and
economic
background
1 KHAZANAH NASIONAL BERHAD 210,484,693
38.32
%
State-controlled
2 EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUNDBOARD 60,017,000
10.93
%
Government
controlled fund
3
RHB NOMINEES (TEMPATAN) SDN.
BHD.
PERTROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD
35,676,680 6.50%
National
Petroleum
Holdings
4
CIMSEC NOMINEES (TEMPATAN)
SDN. BHD.
SECURITY TRUSTEE (KCW ISSUE 2)
24,250,000 4.42%
Indigenous
government-led
investment bank
5 LEMBAGA TABUNG HAJI 16,820,427 3.06%
Islamic funds,
based on a vast
rubber plantation
6
CARTABAN NOMINEES (ASING)
SDN. BHD. GOVERNMENT OF
SINGAPORE INVESTMENT
CORPORATION PTE.LTD. FOR
GOVERMENT OF SINGAPORE (C)
14,185,300 2.58%
Singapore's state-
controlled fund
(foreign capital)
7 PERMODALAN NASIONAL BERHAD 8,838,000 1.61%
Indigenous
Education
Development
Fund
8
CARTABAN NOMINEES
(TEMPATAN) SDN. BHD. AMANAH
SSCM NOMINEES (TEMPATAN) SDN.
BHD. FOR EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT
FUND BOARD (JF404)
8,094,900 1.47%
Malaysia
Employment
Fund
9 PERECOM INDUSTRIES SDN. BHD. 7,444,000 1.36%
Malaysia
Technology
Group
10
HSBC NOMINEES (ASING) SDN.
BHD. TNTC FOR SAUDI ARABIAN
MONETARY AGENCY
6,835,998 1.24%
HSBC, Foreign
Capital
Source: Proton Holdings Berhad, Annual Report 2006.
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As for the protection of the automotive
industry, in addition to state regulation of
the ownership structure and industrial
supply chain, the Malaysian policy that was
most criticized by other ASEAN countries
was the use of Approved Permits (AP) to
protect domestic assembly plants, and offer
more opportunities for Malay enterprises to
participate in the sales of imported cars. As
the country's economy developed, the
demand for imported cars also increased,
and those who had an AP could control
import quotas, leading to political
competition. Malaysia's industrial policy
eventually evolved into chips-distributing
political favouritism, which weakened the
competitiveness of external competitors
(foreign car manufacturers) when they tried
to enter the domestic market.
In contrast to Malaysia, by following
economic development policies and open
politics, public and private sectors in
Thailand have transformed from a
relationship of “Clientism” to “Partnership”
since the 1980s. The industrial sector
improved the effect of state policy, and
industrial policy accordingly adjusted to
regime change. Before the 1980s, Thailand
had an authoritarian military regime, and
preferred the policies of state capitalism and
economic nationalism. After the 1980s,
Thailand adopted the industrial policy of a
self-adjusting market, and supervision from
public opinion and interest groups helped
the automotive industry make adjustments
in the direction of market liberalization and
transformation (Shen, 2004).
Differing from Thailand’s frequent
coups and lack of effective state
intervention, Malaysia has a strong state
and the ethnic Malay community has
continued to dominate the political system,
and lead the industrial policy formulated by
the State. The automotive industry appears
to have adopted “rent-seeking” behavior,
the political effect of market intervention,
with political factors being the major
obstacles to industry transformation.
Because of the political and economic
structure, the State (controlled by ethnic
Malay communities), domestic capital
(controlled by Chinese enterprises), and
foreign capital could not build a cooperative
relationship and was not able to follow
Thailand’s dependency development
example and form a triple alliance. The
country's economic policy and heavy
industry policy have deterred Chinese
capital from investing in the automotive
industry, and thus impeded the capital
investment required for industrial
transformation (Lubeck, 1992). When non-
economic goals became more important
than economic ones, the lack of an
adjustment to Malaysia's development
strategy in the face of the challenge of
opening up to international markets
eventually leads to significant problems
with industrial development.
Conclusion
Comparing the automotive industries in
two newly industrialized Southeast Asian
countries, Malaysia and Thailand, this
research examines how, during the process
of economic development, the State chose to
intervene in industrial development, and
how it influenced the political and
economic situation. As in many other
developing countries, Malaysia has a strong
state and was able to use the New Economic
Plan and the National Plan of Heavy
Industry as policy tools to establish a
domestic industry. Establishment of the
automotive industry in Malaysia was thus
the result of protectionist policies based on
political and economic reasons, consistent
with the ideology of “indigenous priority.”
Differing from Malaysia, the early
automotive industry in Thailand also chose
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to employ market protection, and use
import-substitution as the developmental
strategy. This research found two
significant differences between Malaysia
and Thailand in how the State conducted its
industrial policy. First, two different
industrial strategies were chosen, namely
independent development in Malaysia and
dependency development in Thailand.
Second, the political nature of the Malaysia
automotive industry hindered its
subsequent industrial policy, and made it
difficult to adopt a policy of following the
market. In short, industrial development,
particularly the automotive industry, has
been closely related to Malaysian political
and economic characteristics.
In contrast, as the Thai government
stated in its “Automotive Industry in
Thailand,” the country was able to have the
largest car assembly market among ASEAN
countries and produce the highest quality
vehicles because it opened its domestic
market and attempted global integration.
The country has also had greater potential
for market growth and a stable political
climate, and a state that supports free trade
and open investment policies. Thailand
possesses no ethnic conflict or national car
program. With a more open attitude,
Thailand has attracted more investments
into its automotive industry. However, the
lack of ethnic problems does not necessarily
mean that there is no political interference
in the industry, while the lack of a national
car program and greater liberalization do
not necessarily mean that rent-seeking is
not a problem.
Table 9: Political and economic comparison of different developmental strategies used in
Malaysia and Thailand
Criteria
Automotive industry in
Malaysia
Independent Mode
Automotive industry in
Thailand
Dependency Development
Key important dates in the
development of the of
industry
 In 1962, the domestic
automotive industry
was first established
 In 1982, the domestic
car production project
was implemented.
 In 1985, the first
domestic car was
introduced, to become
the only domestic car
brand in Southeast Asia
 In 1961, Thailand’s
Automotive Industry
Corporation was
established
 In 1980, the import
substitution industrial
policy was implemented
 In 1985, cooperation with
Japanese capital
gradually relaxed
industrial restrictions
 After the 1990s,
industrial policy was
revised to become more
export-oriented
The Role of the State
 A strong state
dominated industrial
policy and considered
the automotive
industry as a national
 Industrial policy changed
because of political
changes
 After the 1980s, politics
became open and the
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industry. Domestic car
manufacturers were
protected by this
policy.
 The political regime
remained unchanged,
and no major revisions
to the industrial policy
were made
State adjusted the
industrial policy
With or without national
brand and specific models
 Yes
 Proton and Perodua
 No
 Focus on the
development of specific
vehicles—, such as pick-
up trucks
The relationship between
the industry and politics
 The automotive
industry protected the
distribution and
employment
opportunities of ethnic
Malay individuals, and
placed restrictions on
other ethnic groups.
 Import licenses became
the privilege of Malay
individuals
 The industry relied on
the State and was not
market-oriented
 Industrial policy was
more independent of
political influence
The relationship with
international car
manufacturers
(multinational enterprises)
 The New Economic
Policy and Heavy
Industry Policy
deterred domestic
Chinese investors from
entering the
automotive industry
 Limited cooperation in
the international
market, and the State
dominated industry
development
 State, domestic, and
foreign capital formed a
triple alliance
 Cooperated with
multinational enterprises
and employed industrial
division of labour
Sales market
 A high proportion of
domestic sales, and
thus the problem of a
saturated domestic
market
 A high proportion of
exports, up to one third
of production
The attitude toward  Implemented tariff  Tariff reduction since
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ASEAN Industrial
Cooperation and Free
Trade agreements
protection until 2008
 Non-tariff protection of
import licenses was
continued until 2010
2000
 Support for industrial
cooperation and free
trade
Source: Organized by the author
Jenkin (1995) compared the automotive
industry in Taiwan and South Korea and
believed that the reason why the latter
could build up an independent automotive
industry was because the State could
overcome pressure from the private sector
and multinational companies and gain
control of the industry. In contrast, the State
in Taiwan could not handle the conflict
arising from integration of the domestic
private sector and multinational companies,
and it became difficult for the government
to lead the industry, and thus it lost the
opportunity to establish an independent
automotive industry. In short, the reasons
for the success of South Korea's automotive
industry are as follows: a strong state,
highly distorted market mechanisms, and
the cooperation with a large consortia.
However, this research finds that the
opposite situation holds in the countries
examined. Specifically, although Malaysia
has a strong state, the projects conducted by
state-led enterprises have not helped
industrial development, while Thailand,
which followed an open market model,
allowed multinational auto groups to enter
the domestic market, which resulted in
good industrial development. Why are the
results between this study and the earlier
one so different? Jomo stated that the
developmental modes of newly
industrialized countries in East Asia and
Southeast Asia differ. However, is this
related to a country’s relative position in the
structure of the global system? This remains
a question for future Southeast Asian
political and economic research.
Returning to the first discussion about
the relationship between the State and the
global automotive industry, as global and
regional supply chains were formed, the
automotive industry in developing
countries was increasingly affected by free
trade agreements, and it became necessary
for them to choose between the strategies of
dependency development and the
independent mode. Intel's former CEO,
Andrew Grove, in his letter to the Wall
Street Journal stated: “What can Detroit
learn from Silicon Valley?” In the letter, he
stated that when one of a country’s
industries encounters difficulties, they must
figure out whether it is because of a fall in
competitiveness, or global industrial
restructuring. If the former, then national
intervention would prove helpful, while it
would prove harmful in the latter condition,
and even eventually cause the whole nation
to lose its competitiveness (Grove, 2009).
Grove further stated that the future of the
automotive industry, just as the division of
labor in the technology industry, is
undergoing an ongoing restructuring from
a vertical to horizontal mode. Therefore,
future vehicles would thus be produced by
the assembly of standardized components.
In this context, although many Asian
manufacturers might not be able to produce
a whole car, the ability to control key
components would gain them future
industry opportunities in these countries.
Grove’s point of view could serve as the
answer to these questions, that is, the state
could follow the market and find a new
business model and new competitive
advantage, all of which are important
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strategies to maintain national industrial
development.
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